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BALANCING SUSTAINABILITY, THE RIGHT 
TO REGULATE, AND THE NEED FOR 
INVESTOR PROTECTION: LESSONS FROM 
THE TRADE REGIME 
ELIZABETH TRUJILLO* 
Abstract: Recent initiatives for investment reform demonstrated by the 2016 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development and 2018 World Invest-
ment Reports have raised key issues for sustainable development in the context 
of investment in natural resources and energy. Where there has been increasing 
convergence between trade and environmental norms as trade regimes confront 
domestic regulatory measures for environmental protection and climate change 
mitigation, similarly investment regimes also have had to address such domestic 
measures but with little progress towards normative convergence. At the same 
time, there’s an increasing skepticism for the traditional models of globalization 
of the 1990s and more recognition of the need for economic models that foster 
sustainability and local stability. This Article will analyze four primary areas in 
which investment law intersects with environmental and climate change policies. 
Drawing from lessons learned in the trade context, it will examine the following 
areas in which investment law will need to better address domestic policies: (1) 
regulation, especially those in the form of direct and indirect taxes; (2) subsidies; 
(3) labeling schemes; and (4) local content requirements. These will be discussed 
against the backdrop of today’s changing landscape regarding popular attitudes 
towards globalization and the right to regulate. The Article will conclude with a 
discussion of the challenges ahead for investment in natural resources and ener-
gy, especially in Latin America where some governments are changing the con-
stitutional framework in which nature should be managed. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Eco-Minerals Angotura gold mining project in Colombia is one of 
several high altitude páramo ecosystems mining projects involving foreign 
investors that was blocked in 2016 from continuing operations by the Colom-
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bian constitutional court.1 Investors are complaining that their rights were vio-
lated when the court overturned several licenses for such operations because of 
the irreparable damage caused to several sensitive ecosystems known as the 
páramos.2 The páramos provide water to over seventy percent of Colombians 
and they are a major carbon sink which helps to combat climate change.3 Ca-
nadian mining operations in Latin America since the 1990s, such as the Eco-
Minerals Angotura gold mining project, have raised eyebrows with respect to 
human rights violations and a lack of environmental concerns.4 
Recent initiatives for investment reform as discussed in the United Na-
tions Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 2016 World Invest-
ment Report, have raised key issues for sustainable development in the context 
of investment in natural resources and energy.5 There has been increasing con-
vergence between trade and environmental norms as trade regimes confront 
domestic regulatory measures for environmental protection and climate change 
mitigation. Similarly, investment regimes also have had to address such do-
mestic measures, but with little progress towards normative convergence. For-
eign direct investment (“FDI”) in extractive industries is prevalent in both de-
                                                                                                                           
 1 Chris Bell, Colombia’s Páramos: What Are They and Why You Must See Them?, UNCOVER 
COLOMBIA (Aug. 30, 2017), http://www.uncovercolombia.com/en/item/colombia-paramos-why-see-
them [https://perma.cc/S6X7-BSQL] (explaining that Páramo ecosystems, found only in South Amer-
ica’s northern Andes and in some parts of southern Central America, “are defined broadly as the eco-
system existing above the continuous forest line, but below the permanent snowline”). 
 2 Eco Oro Minerales Corp., Eco Oro Files Memorial in Arbitration Against Colombia, CISON 
(Mar. 20, 2018), https://www.newswire.ca/news-releases/eco-oro-files-memorial-in-arbitration-
against-colombia-677385833.html [https://perma.cc/KD6W-ZBVW]. 
 3 Protecting the Colombia Páramo from Eco Oro Mining, CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL ENVI-
RONMENTAL LAW: CAMPAIGN UPDATE (Feb. 2017), https://www.ciel.org/project-update/eco-oro/ 
[https://perma.cc/X7LU-KVEE]. 
 4 See generally MiningWatch & CENSAT-Agua Viva, Land and Conflict—Resource Extraction, 
Human Rights, and Corporate Social Responsibility: Canadian Companies in Colombia, INTER-
PARES (Sept. 1, 2009), https://interpares.ca/sites/default/files/resources/2009-09LandAndConflict
ResourceExtractionHumanRightsAndCorporateSocialResponsibility.pdf [https://perma.cc/8JG6-
7P4U] (analyzing the human rights and environmental concerns present in four Canadian extractive 
industry investment projects in Colombia); Working Group on Mining and Human Rights in Latin 
America, The Impact of Canadian Mining in Latin America and Canada’s Responsibility: Executive 
Summary of the Report Submitted to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, http://www.
dplf.org/sites/default/files/report_canadian_mining_executive_summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/W2LE-
ATGS] (explaining the various human rights and environmental issues that have arisen from Canadian 
mining operations in Latin America). 
 5 Ban Ki-Moon, Preface to U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, WORLD INVEST-
MENT REPORT 2016, INVESTOR NATIONALITY: POLICY CHALLENGES, at iii (2016) [hereinafter 2016 
UNCTAD INVESTMENT REPORT] (explaining the report’s initatives to “further enhance the enabling 
environment for investment in sustainable development”). The 2018 UNCTAD World Investment 
Report indicates a decline in foreign direct investment overall, as compared to 2016. See Antonio 
Guterres, U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2016, 
INVESTMENT AND NEW INDUSTRIAL POLICIES, at iii (2018) [hereinafter 2018 UNCTAD INVESTMENT 
REPORT] (explaining that foreign direct investment saw a twenty-three percent decline in 2017 with 
only a “very modest recovery” anticipated for 2018). 
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veloping and developed countries and it raises many questions not only regard-
ing human rights and environmental protection, but also the sovereign right to 
regulate natural resources by the host state. Global FDI inflows rose by thirty-
eight percent to $1.76 trillion in 2015, at which point Asia was the largest re-
cipient region of FDI inflows.6 The top FDI inflows have actually been to de-
veloped countries, including the United States, although this has declined 
somewhat in 2017.7 With new technologies and sustainable development goals 
driving new, cleaner industrial policy, FDI provides opportunities for growth. 
Still, investment regimes must also adjust the balance between the rights of 
investors and those of the state to regulate in areas of public interest like natu-
ral resources and the environment. 
This Article will analyze four primary areas in which investment law in-
tersects with environmental and climate change policies. Part I will discuss the 
legal doctrines and practical implications of the right to regulate.8 Drawing 
from lessons learned in the trade context, Part II will discuss ways in which 
investment law must better address these domestic policies in the following 
areas: (1) regulatory policies, especially those in the form of direct and indirect 
taxes; (2) subsidies; (3) labeling schemes; and (4) local content requirements.9 
These will be discussed within the backdrop of today’s changing landscape 
concerning globalization and regulation. Finally, Part III will discuss challeng-
es moving forward regarding investment in natural resources and the right to 
regulate, especially as some countries in Latin America establish constitutional 
reforms with respect to environmental protection.10 
I. RIGHT TO REGULATE 
There is much discussion regarding the ability of governments to regulate 
without the interference of international law, as part of their sovereign rights as 
nation-states.11 This is not a new idea, in that both international trade and in-
                                                                                                                           
 6 2016 UNCTAD INVESTMENT REPORT, supra note 5, at x. The 2018 UNCTAD INVESTMENT 
REPORT found that FDI inflows decreased overall to $1.43 trillion in 2017, a decrease of 23%; but, 
inflows to Latin America and the Caribbean remained stable whereas those to developed countries 
fell, mostly due to decreases to the United States and the United Kingdom. 2018 UNCTAD INVEST-
MENT REPORT, supra note 5, at xi. 
 7 See 2018 UNCTAD INVESTMENT REPORT, supra note 5, at xi. (explaining that FDI inflows to 
developed countries fell by thirty-seven percent in 2017). 
 8 See infra notes 11–60 and accompanying text. 
 9 See infra notes 61–131 and accompanying text. 
 10 See infra notes 132–182 and accompanying text. 
 11 See, e.g., Howard Mann, The Right of States to Regulate and International Investment Law in 
EXPERT MEETING ON THE DEVELOPMENT DIMENSION OF FDI (Nov. 6–8, 2002), https://www.iisd.org/
pdf/2003/investment_right_to_regulate.pdf [https://perma.cc/88AH-FKQF]; David Gaukrodger, The 
Balance Between Investor Protection and the Right to Regulate in Investment Treaties: A Scoping 
Paper, OECD WORKING PAPERS ON INT’L INV. (2017), https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/finance-and-
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vestor-state treaties have contained provisions regarding these issues from the 
beginning.12 Only recently, however, with growing concerns in the industrial-
ized world regarding the negative impacts of international trade and invest-
ment on local jobs, the ability to pass regulation regarding health and the envi-
ronment, and a popular distaste for globalization, has the right to regulate dis-
cussion had some traction. Recent preferential trade agreements (“PTAs”) such 
as the European Union-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agree-
ment (“CETA”) and the Canada-Colombia Free Trade Agreement (“CCFTA”), 
contain such a provision.13 The scope of the right to regulate is less clear, 
though it would implicate many of the traditional doctrines that deal with regu-
lation.14 These recent PTAs also emphasize the need for regulatory cooperation 
among parties so they may mutually agree to regulations that achieve social 
policy goals while also achieving commitments under trade agreements. In 
fact, transnational regulatory bodies have become institutionalized in many of 
the PTAs such as CETA.15 When comparing trade jurisprudence to that of in-
vestment, though, investment tribunals have tended to be more deferential to 
regulatory structures of the parties than trade dispute settlement bodies, as 
many of the Chapter 11 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) cas-
es demonstrate.16 This may, in part, be due to the fact that a multilateral treaty 
                                                                                                                           
investment/the-balance-between-investor-protection-and-the-right-to-regulate-in-investment-treaties_
82786801-en [https://perma.cc/WEH6-LVX6]. 
 12 See infra notes 29–44 and accompanying text. 
 13 Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, Can.-E.U., art. 24.3, Oct. 30, 2016, 2017 O.J. 
(L 11) 23, 167 (E.U.), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/september/tradoc_152806.pdf 
[https://perma.cc./WTW5-N6BL] [hereinafter CETA]; Canada-Colombia Free Trade Agreement, 
Can.-Colom., art. 2201(3), Nov. 21, 2008, 2011 Can. T.S. No. 11, art. 2201(3), https://wits.worldbank.
org/GPTAD/PDF/archive/canada-columbia.pdf [https://perma.cc/N6F3-P7HE] [hereinafter CCFTA]. 
 14 See infra notes 21–28 and accompanying text. 
 15 See, e.g., CETA, supra note 13, art. 26.2(1)(g) (creating a transnational regulatory body called 
the Committee on Trade and Sustainable Development). For more on this growing trend of transna-
tional regulatory bodies in trade, see generally Elizabeth Trujillo, Regulatory Cooperation in Interna-
tional Trade and Its Transformative Effects on Executive Power, 25 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 365 
(2018) [hereinafter Trujillo, Regulatory Cooperation] (discussing the recent trend towards creating 
transnational regulatory bodies in international trade agreements). 
 16 North American Free Trade Agreement, Can.-Mex.-U.S., arts. 713, 905, Dec. 17, 1992, 107 
Stat. 2057, 32 I.L.M. 289 [hereinafter NAFTA]; see Elizabeth Trujillo, Mission Possible: Reciprocal 
Deference Between Domestic Regulatory Structures and the WTO, 40 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 201, 234–
49 (2007) (comparing deference to domestic regulatory processes in trade and investment) [hereinafter 
Trujillo, Mission Possible]; see also Nicholas DiMascio & Joost Pauwelyn, Nondiscrimination in 
Trade and Investment Treaties: Worlds Apart or Two Sides of the Same Coin?, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 
48, 58–79 (2008) (comparing the level of deference toward a sovereign’s right to regulate in cases 
from trade tribunals and cases from investment tribunals). The NAFTA is currently under renegotia-
tions. See Int’l Ctr. for Trade & Sustainable Dev., NAFTA Negotiators Close Fifth Round, Prepare to 
Set Stage for 2018 Talks, 21 BRIDGES WKLY. 1, 3 (Nov. 2017), https://www.ictsd.org/sites/default/
files/review/bridgesweekly21-39.pdf [https://perma.cc/3TDM-TZNU] (discussing the NAFTA rene-
gotiations in the context of the TPP-11). On September 30, 2018, the United States-Mexico-Canada 
Agreement was signed but still needs to be approved by the respective legislatures. See Adam 
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under the auspices of the World Trade Organization (WTO) governs all trade 
liberalization and is applicable, though unclear to what extent, to PTAs.17 
Section A of this Part discusses the legal doctrines that implicate the right 
to regulate in the investment context.18 Section B of this Part addresses the ap-
plication of the right to regulate in PTAs.19 Finally, Section C of this Part ex-
plains how the different levels of deference that trade and investment tribunals 
give to domestic regulatory schemes contribute towards the development of 
the concept of the right to regulate.20 
A. Legal Doctrines Implicating Right to Regulate 
In investment treaties, the notion of a right to regulate is contained in le-
gal doctrines such as indirect expropriation, fair and equitable treatment, and 
national treatment. The following issues are considered when an investment 
tribunal considers an expropriation. First, investment tribunals consider the 
degree of economic impact created by expropriation. This has been measured 
against whether there is substantial interference, depriving an investor of fun-
damental rights of ownership (not just loss of profits).21 Second, investment 
tribunals consider the purpose and context of the expropriatory measure at is-
sue. In assessing the purpose and context of the expropriatory measure, tribu-
nals consider (1) whether the measure is connected to the state’s right to pro-
mote a recognized social purpose or the general welfare by regulation; and (2) 
that “there must be a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the 
charge of weight imposed to the foreign investor and the aim sought to be real-
ized by an expropriatory measure.”22 Similarly, when tribunals consider na-
tional treatment issues, they use a balancing test: if there are differences in 
                                                                                                                           
Behsudi, The USMCA Has Landed, POLITICO (Oct. 1, 2018), https://www.politico.com/newsletters/
morning-trade/2018/10/01/the-usmca-has-landed-358167 [https://perma.cc/H86Z-D3LB]. The discus-
sion on NAFTA in this Article is in accordance with the original NAFTA agreement which, at the 
time of this Article, is in effect. 
 17 See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XXIV, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 
U.N.T.S. 194, 268–72 [hereinafter GATT] (permitting the formation of preferential trade agreements 
within the auspices of the WTO rules). 
 18 See infra notes 21–28 and accompanying text. 
 19 See infra notes 29–44 and accompanying text. 
 20 See infra notes 45–60 and accompanying text. 
 21 See, e.g., Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. & Vivendi Universal S.A. v. Argentine Re-
public, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, Award, ¶ 7.5.17 (Aug. 20, 2007), https://www.italaw.com/sites/
default/files/case-documents/ita0215.pdf [https://perma.cc/9L3K-HE2A] (citing a United Nations 
study for the proposition that “takings tantamount to expropriation are those that result in a substantial 
loss of control or value of a foreign investment”). 
 22 Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/00/2, Award, 
¶ 122 (May 29, 2003), 10 ICSID Rep. 130 (2003). Tribunals tend to apply a proportionality test, fol-
lowing the European Court of Human Rights, where “there must be a reasonable relationship of pro-
portionality between the means employed and the aim pursued.” See id. ¶ 122 n.141 (citing Mellacher 
v. Austria, 169 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 4 (1989)). 
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treatment between domestic and foreign investments, those differences should 
have “a reasonable nexus to rational government policies that (1) do not dis-
tinguish, on their face or de facto, between foreign-owned and domestic com-
panies; and (2) do not otherwise unduly undermine the investment liberalizing 
objectives . . . .”23 
Third, in assessing indirect expropriation, tribunals consider the police 
powers of the state; that is, those measures concerning the public interest such 
as municipal planning, safety, health and environmental issues, as well as areas 
involving serious fines and penalties.24 The police powers of the state are also 
taken into account in deciding whether a measure passes the fair and equitable 
test, which is a type of due process standard in the investment context.25 In-
vestment tribunals recognize that it would be unreasonable for investors to use 
bilateral investment treaties as an “insurance policy against the risk of any 
changes in the host state’s legal and economic framework.”26 Ultimately, it 
comes down to what is fair and reasonable under the circumstances, for “it is 
unthinkable that a state could make a general commitment to all foreign inves-
tors never to change its legislation whatever the circumstances and it would be 
unreasonable for an investor to rely on such a freeze.”27 
Finally, tribunals consider the level of interference of the measure with 
the reasonable investment backed expectations. In other words, a claimant 
must show that the investment made was based on a current state of affairs that 
did not include the measure and that it was not reasonably foreseeable that 
such a measure would be passed. In a case brought under Chapter 11 of 
NAFTA in 2002, Feldman v. Mexico, the tribunal recognized that governments 
had the power to frequently change their laws and regulations as necessary 
                                                                                                                           
 23 Pope & Talbot v. Canada, Award on the Merits of Phase 2, ¶ 78 (Apr. 10, 2001), 7 ICSID Rep. 
102 (2001). 
 24 See Tecnicas Medioambientales, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/00/2, Award, ¶ 119 (stating the 
principle that “the State’s exercise of its sovereign power within the framework of its police power 
may cause economic damage to those subject to its powers as administrator without entitling them to 
any compensation whatsoever is undisputable”). 
 25 See Chemtura Corp. v. Canada, Award, ¶¶ 254, 266 (Aug. 2, 2010) (finding no expropriation 
where the measures in question were an appropriate use of the state’s police powers); see also Ken-
neth J. Vandevelde, A Unified Theory of Fair & Equitable Treatment, 43 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 
43, 89–96 (2010) (explaining the development of the fair and equitable treatment test as a due process 
standard). 
 26 See EDF (Services) Ltd. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/13, Award, ¶ 217 (Oct. 8, 
2009); see also Continental Casualty v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award, 
¶ 258 (Sep. 5, 2008) (stating it would be “unconscionable for a country to promise not to change its 
legislation as time and needs change”). 
 27 El Paso Energy Int’l Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB03/15, Award, ¶ 372 
(Oct. 31, 2011). 
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under economic and social conditions, and that “[t]hose changes may well 
make certain activities less profitable or even uneconomic to continue . . . .”28 
B. Right to Regulate in Preferential Trade Agreements 
In international trade, recent preferential trade agreements explicitly have 
included “right to regulate” provisions.29 However, as in investment law, inter-
national trade treaties have always contained specific provisions that address 
the ability of states to regulate domestically. The WTO Dispute Settlement 
Body (“DSB”) has established jurisprudence on non-tariff barriers intended to 
balance the principle of trade liberalization with that of domestic social policy, 
though it has changed in scope and emphasis over time. Some of these cases 
will be discussed in the next section.30 Recent PTAs that contain right to regu-
late provisions span from higher to lower levels of commitments for participat-
ing states. For example, the CETA contains provisions on the right to regulate 
for both trade and for investment.31 It is less clear what these mean in practice, 
but the treaty also contains other provisions that allow states to have broad so-
cial policy space.32 For example, the chapters on sustainable development for 
the environment do not recognize the precautionary principle per se, but they 
do recognize that the life-cycle of a product, or process and production method 
(“PPM”), may require regulation and that scientific uncertainty should not 
postpone “cost-effective measures of prevent[ing] environmental degrada-
tion.”33 
The CCFTA and NAFTA have no general right to regulate provision per 
se, but the CCFTA does include a sovereign right for the state to manage envi-
                                                                                                                           
 28 Feldman v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1, Award, ¶ 112 (Dec. 16, 2002), 7 ICSID 
Rep. 341 (2002). 
 29 See, e.g., CETA, supra note 13, art. 24.3; CCFTA, supra note 13, art. 2201. 
 30 See infra notes 61–131 and accompanying text. 
 31 See CETA, supra note 13, arts. 8.9, 24.3. 
 32 See, e.g., id. art. 5.6 (explaining that an importing party shall accept certain measures of an 
exporting party as long as the exporting party “objectively demonstrates to the importing [p]arty that 
its measure achieves the importing [p]arty’s appropriate level of . . . protection”). 
 33 Id. art. 24.8(2); see also id. arts. 23–24 (referring to trade, the environment, and sustainable 
development more generally). Previous drafts of the CETA did not contain a precautionary principle, 
but the issue was debated since the EU adheres to the precautionary principle whereas Canada and the 
United States do not. See generally Peter-Tobias Stoll et al., CETA, TTIP, and the EU Precautionary 
Principle, FOODWATCH (June 2016), https://euagenda.eu/upload/publications/untitled-60129-ea.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6THZ-WARH]. The EU has given up on the precautionary principle, despite its 
adoption of it in other free trade agreements, such as with South Korea, Peru, and Colombia. See, e.g., 
European Union-South Korea Free Trade Agreement, South Korea-E.U., ch. 13, Oct. 6, 2010, 2011 
O.J. (L 127) 62, 62–65 (E.U), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:
22011A0514(01) [https://perma.cc/MR4D-6TBK] (laying out the precautionary principle as it relates 
to trade and the environment). 
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ronmental and natural resources.34 Furthermore, in addition to recognizing the 
role of corporate social responsibility for promoting environmental, labor, and 
human rights,35 the investment chapter of the CCFTA states that “it is inappro-
priate to encourage investment by relaxing domestic health, safety or environ-
mental measures.”36 This chapter, in Annex 811, also lays out the four factors 
to consider, discussed above, in assessing indirect expropriation.37 The CCFTA 
lays out an Agreement on the Environment, much like the NAFTA did with the 
side agreement on Environmental Cooperation.38 However, the CCFTA’s 
Agreement on the Environment is more specific than the NAFTA side agree-
ment and includes a commitment “not to derogate from domestic environmen-
tal laws in order to encourage trade and investment.”39 
In these PTAs, it is less clear to what extent the right to regulate relates to 
investment. Because recent PTAs, which include a bilateral investment treaty 
(BIT), also contain a general right to regulate, that right arguably also applies 
to the investment chapter. Specific chapters of a PTA may also restate the right 
to regulate, including the investment chapter. For example, the investment 
chapter of CETA explicitly recognizes the state’s right to regulate in the Pro-
logue and Article 8.9, and clarifies that a modification of laws or regulations 
(including the continuance or discontinuance of subsidies) does not per se 
translate into a violation of the treaty.40 Chapter 24 recognizes the rights of 
Canada and the European Union to regulate the environment and to pass or 
                                                                                                                           
 34 CCFTA, supra note 13, art. 1701. The current version of the United States-Mexico-Canada 
Agreement contains a chapter on “good regulatory practices” and Article 28.3 of that chapter recog-
nizes the importance of each country’s “central regulatory coordinating bodies.” See United States-
Mexico-Canada Agreement, art. 28.3 (unsigned), OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/agreements/FTA/USMCA/28%20Good%20Regulatory%20
Practices.pdf [https://perma.cc/YP6N-XPLE]. 
 35 Id. art. 816. 
 36 Id. art. 815. 
 37 See id. Annex 811. This provision states that indirect expropriation should be assessed on a 
“case-by-case” basis, but that the following should be considered: (1) “the economic impact of the 
measure”; (2) “the extent to which the measure interfere[s] with . . . reasonable investment-backed 
expectations;” (3) “the character of the measure”; and (4) “legitimate public welfare objectives,” like 
environmental protection. Id. 
 38 CCFTA, supra note 13, art. 1703; North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, 
Can.-Mex.-U.S., Sept. 14, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1480 (1993). 
 39 CCFTA, supra note 13, art. 1703. Article 1701 states that “each Party has sovereign rights and 
responsibilities to conserve and protect its environment” and affirms their commitments under domes-
tic and international environmental law. Id. art. 1701. 
 40 See CETA, supra note 13, art. 8.9; see also id. art. 3 (“Recognising that the provisions of this 
Agreement protect investments and investors with respect to their investments, and are intended to 
stimulate mutually-beneficial business activity, without undermining the right of the parties to regu-
late in the public interest within their territories.”). 
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modify laws and regulations to ensure the highest levels of protection.41 Fur-
thermore, Article 24.9 specifically recognizes the parties’ commitment to pro-
tecting the environment in both their trade and investment endeavors, includ-
ing reducing barriers to environmental goods and services—especially those 
that further climate change mitigation strategies.42 Finally, the CETA establish-
es formal transnational regulatory cooperation through the creation of specific 
committees on sustainable development for the environment and labor as well 
as broader regulatory cooperation with the Committee on Sustainable Devel-
opment in Chapter 22.43 The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), in its original 
form, also envisioned similar institutionalized regulatory cooperation.44 
In sum, CETA is the first free trade agreement to be so specific on trans-
national regulatory cooperation and to provide so much leeway to parties in 
deciding the best regulatory strategies for environmental protection. It also 
leaves much ambiguity, however, as to the extent that the parties may use the 
right to regulate to justify measures that may impact trade and investment. 
C. Deference 
The level of deference that an international trade or investment tribunal 
gives to domestic regulatory schemes has contributed towards providing con-
text to the emerging concept of the “right to regulate.” As discussed above, 
investment tribunals typically balance the legitimacy of regulatory measures 
with the rights of investors through their interpretation of the fair and equitable 
treatment, national treatment, and expropriation doctrines.45 Trade panels, on 
the other hand, arguably are less deferential towards regulatory measures, un-
less they are in line with international standards. But, trade panels have in-
creasingly provided more social policy space for environmental protection 
through their application of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
Article III, GATT Article XX, and the Technical Barriers to Trade (“TBT”) 
Agreement.46 In trade disputes brought under GATT Article III:4, which ad-
                                                                                                                           
 41 CCFTA, supra note 13, art. 24.2 (“The Parties stress that enhanced cooperation to protect and 
conserve the environment brings benefits that will . . . strengthen the environmental governance of the 
Parties.”). 
 42 See id. art. 24.9. 
 43 See id. arts. 22.4(1), 26.2(1)(g) (establishing the Committee on Trade and Sustainable Devel-
opment, and further establishing the mechanisms for operating the Committee on Trade and Sustaina-
ble Development); see also id. ch. 25 (discussing trade and sustainable development). 
 44 See Trans-Pacific Partnership, art. 25.2, Feb. 4, 2016, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRE-
SENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-partnership/tpp-full-
text [https://perma.cc/238A-H4B5]. 
 45 See supra notes 21–44 and accompanying text. 
 46 See GATT, supra note 17, arts. III, XX; Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement, art. 2.4, Apr. 
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 
401, https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/17-tbt.pdf [https://perma.cc/HS7B-S62U] [hereinaf-
ter TBT Agreement]; Trujillo, Mission Possible, supra note 16, at 202–11 (comparing investment and 
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dresses non-fiscal measures that impact trade, dispute settlement bodies broad-
ly will take into account the least restrictive alternative means of achieving the 
legitimate objective in terms of the measure’s discriminatory impact on trade.47 
For example, the “like circumstances” test for national treatment in the inves-
tor-state context takes into account the full scope of economic and social cir-
cumstances surrounding an investment.48 Deference towards regulatory 
measures can also been seen in international arbitrations addressing state police 
powers and the use of scientific evidence.49 In the case brought under NAFTA 
Chapter 11, Gami Investments, Inc. v. Mexico, which addressed whether the 
Mexican government’s subsidies of Mexican sugar mills were discriminating 
against foreign investors, the tribunal emphasized that “Mexico perceived that 
mills operating in conditions of effective insolvency needed public participa-
tion in the interest of the national economy in a broad sense.”50 The tribunal 
rejected the claimant’s argument of discrimination and instead deferred to 
Mexico’s regulatory structures in place.51 Further, the tribunal found that the 
Mexican government was motivated to expropriate some mills for the public 
interest in salvaging financially troubled mills from insolvency.52 
Recent WTO cases, however, have been deferential—especially those re-
lated to renewable energy policies—where member states need more discretion 
on policy matters to transition their economies towards cleaner forms of ener-
                                                                                                                           
trade with respect to the degree of deference both offer to domestic regulatory schemes); see also 
WTO Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-
Containing Products, ¶ 123, WTO. Doc. WT/DS135/AB/R (adopted Mar. 12, 2001) [hereinafter As-
bestos Report] (allowing the consideration of regulatory measures in the categories of what constitutes 
“like products” for national treatment); Appellate Body Report, United States—Measures Affecting 
the Production and Sale of Clove-Cigarettes, ¶ 282, WTO Doc. WT/DS406/AB/R (adopted Apr. 4, 
2012) [hereinafter Clove-Cigarettes Report]. 
 47 See, e.g., Panel Report, Brazil—Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, ¶¶ 7.409–.437, 
WTO Doc. WT/DS332/R (adopted June 12, 2007). 
 48 Trujillo, Mission Possible, supra note 16, at 239–40 (discussing the “like circumstances” test as 
it relates to NAFTA Article 1102). 
 49 See, e.g., Int’l Thunderbird Gaming Corp. v. Mexico, NAFTA/UNCITRAL Tribunal, Award, 
¶ 127 (Jan. 26, 2006), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0431.pdf [https://
perma.cc/54W2-QXCG] (finding that the state “can change its regulatory policy and it has a wide 
discretion with respect to how it carries out such policies by regulation and administrative conduct”); 
Mesa Power Group, LLC v. Canada, PCA Case No. 2012-17, Award, ¶ 553 (Perm. Ct. Arb. Mar. 24, 
2016), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw7240.pdf [https://perma.cc/
N76R-3MJU] (emphasizing that in “interpreting and applying the ‘minimum standard,’ a Chapter 
Eleven tribunal does not have an open-ended mandate to second-guess government decision-making” 
(emphasis added) (quotations omitted)). 
 50 Gami Invs., Inc. v. Mexico, UNCITRAL, 13 ICSID Rep. 147, Award, ¶ 114 (Nov. 15, 2004). 
 51 Id. 
 52 See id. (“[The] measure was plausibly connected with a legitimate goal of policy . . . and was 
applied neither in a discriminatory manner nor as a disguised barrier to equal opportunity.”). 
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gy.53 Furthermore, regulatory standards that follow international standards are 
presumed to comply with trade rules.54 This is also true for several BITs in-
cluding in the original NAFTA.55 The challenge, though, for both trade and 
investment regimes confronted with issues concerning clean energy or the use 
of natural resources is the evolving nature of the regulatory schemes in place to 
incentivize projects that both contribute towards economic development and 
cleaner forms of energy. Decarbonization strategies at the domestic level are 
expanding, but regulatory frameworks are not keeping up with this expansion; 
and therefore, need the flexibility to adapt to less chartered territories like re-
newable energy. For this reason, trade and investment treaties that can respond 
to these needs are key to sustainable development. 
In the 2016 case brought under NAFTA Chapter 11, Windstream Energy 
LLC v. Government of Canada, the claimant argued that a moratorium by the 
government of Ontario on offshore wind projects after Ontario had established 
a feed-in tariff (“FIT”) scheme to support the expansion of offshore wind-
power generation violated the NAFTA’s fair and equitable treatment clause.56 
The NAFTA Free Trade Commission interpreted that “fair and equitable treat-
ment” should follow customary international law standard; that is, determining 
whether the conduct was “egregious.”57 The tribunal in Windstream Energy 
used this interpretation to agree with Windstream that the Ontario government 
did not act in a fair and equitable manner.58 However, the tribunal did not find 
the moratorium itself to constitute a violation of the fair and equitable treat-
ment doctrine. Instead, the tribunal found the Ontario government’s treatment 
afterwards—its lack of addressing the scientific uncertainty of the project on 
which the government relied to pass the moratorium in the first place—to con-
stitute a violation of fair and equitable treatment.59 Therefore, some deference 
was given to the government measure, though it was the treatment of the in-
vestor in this context that was found to be a violation.60 
                                                                                                                           
 53 See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, Canada—Renewable Energy Measures Affecting Renewable 
Energy Generation Sector, ¶¶ 5.188–.189, WTO Doc. WT/DS412/AB/R (adopted May 6, 2013) 
[hereinafter Canada—Renewable Energy Measures]. 
 54 TBT Agreement, supra note 46, art. 2.4. 
 55 NAFTA, supra note 16, arts. 713, 905. 
 56 Windstream Energy v. Can., PCA Case No. 2013-22, Award, ¶ 296 (Perm. Ct. Arb. Sept. 27, 
2016), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw7875.pdf [https://perma.cc/
LNT5-NJ6K]. 
 57 See NAFTA Free Trade Comm’n, Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions 
(July 31, 2001), http://www.sice.oas.org/tpd/nafta/Commission/CH11understanding_e.asp [https://
perma.cc/L96D-Z6LG]. 
 58 Id. ¶¶ 296, 352 (disagreeing that the standard laid out in L.F.H. Neer & Pauline Neer v. Mexi-
co, 4 R.I.A.A. 60, 61 (1926) is the standard for fair and equitable treatment). 
 59 Id. ¶¶ 380–382; see also id. ¶ 515 (awarding the claimant CAD $ 25 million in damages and 
CAD 2.9 million in legal fees). 
 60 See id. 
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II. LEARNING FROM TRADE AND COMPARABLE INVESTMENT ISSUES 
International trade has been dealing with environmental protection poli-
cies for several years through its jurisprudence on non-tariff barriers, and it has 
evolved in its approach.61 While early trade cases were more hesitant to allow 
member states broad social policy space in passing environmental regulations 
that impacted trade,62 more recent cases have demonstrated the WTO Appel-
late Body’s willingness to recognize the need for states to address climate 
change mitigation, especially as it pertains to natural resource extraction and 
renewable energy policies, while encouraging them to balance these interests 
with those of trade.63 Environmentalists have frequently criticized the WTO 
for being dismissive of the environment; however, sustainable development 
has been part of the WTO economic framework, albeit always within the con-
text of liberalizing free trade.64 Investment law differs from international trade 
frameworks in several ways, but one important difference is that investment 
law primarily protects the rights of investors, arguably placing it within the 
realm of private international law.65 On the other hand, international trade law 
protects the right of nations to engage in international trade with one another 
without unreasonably burdensome economic barriers imposed by states.66 An-
                                                                                                                           
 61 See Elizabeth Trujillo, A Dialogical Approach to Trade and the Environment, 16 J. INT’L 
ECON. L. 535, 548–50 (2013) [hereinafter Trujillo, Dialogical Approach]. 
 62 See Panel Report, United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, ¶ 7.3, DS21/R (Aug. 16, 
1991), GATT BISD (39th Supp.), at 205 (1993). 
 63 See, e.g., Canada—Renewable Energy Measures, supra note 53; Panel Report, China—
Measures Related to the Exportation of Rare Earths, Tungsten, and Molybdenum, WTO Docs. 
WT/DS431/R, WT/DS432/R, WT/DS433/R (adopted Mar. 26, 2014); see also Appellate Body Re-
port, China—Measures Related to the Exportation of Rare Earths, Tungsten, and Molybdenum, WTO 
Docs. WT/DS431/AB/R, WT/DS432/AB/R, WT/DS433/AB/R (adopted Aug. 7, 2014). 
 64 The Preamble of the Treaty establishing the WTO states: 
Recognizing that relations in the field of trade and economic endeavor should be con-
ducted with a view to . . . expanding the production of and trade in goods and services, 
while allowing for the optimal use of the world’s resources in accordance with the ob-
jective of sustainable development, seeking to protect and preserve the environment and 
to enhance the means for doing so in a manner consistent with their respective needs 
and concerns at different levels of economic development . . . . 
See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 
154, 154, 33 I.L.M. 1144 [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement]. 
 65 See, e.g., Charles N. Brower, W(h)ither International Commercial Arbitration?, 24 ARB. INT’L 
181, 186–90 (2008) (arguing that international investment arbitration is primarily governed by private 
international law instead of international public law). But see Stephan W. Schill, THE MULTILAT-
ERALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 1–22 (2017) (arguing that globalization is push-
ing international investment law out of the realm of private international law and towards multilateral-
ization). For further discussion on whether investment law is governed by private international law or 
international public law, see Julie A. Maupin, Public and Private in International Investment Law: An 
Integrated Systems Approach, 54 VA. J. INT’L L. 367, 371–72 (2014). 
 66 See, e.g., Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 64, at 154 (“The Parties to this Agreement . . . 
[b]eing desirous of contributing to [free trade] by entering into reciprocal and mutually advantageous 
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other primary difference is that international trade is governed by a multilateral 
treaty, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and other WTO 
agreements. Nevertheless, there is no comprehensive governing body or treaty 
that brings together all the investment law and jurisprudence under one um-
brella. In comparing the two legal frameworks in the context of the right to 
regulate and environmental protection, it is helpful to remember that the rights 
of investors are quite different from those of the state. However, when it comes 
to the way in which regulation impacts those rights, similar legal issues arise in 
both legal frameworks. For this reason, it is useful to consider the ways in 
which international trade has addressed some of these areas. 
In international trade, there are four primary areas where sustainable de-
velopment issues, as they pertain to the environment, arise: (1) direct and indi-
rect taxes; (2) subsidies; (3) labeling schemes; and (4) local content require-
ments.67 On the investment side, these are areas where there can also be con-
flict between the protection of investor rights and those of the environment. 
The following sections will briefly discuss these areas in both the context of 
trade and investment. 
Section A of this Part discusses sustainable development issues that arise 
with direct and indirect taxes in the context of international trade and invest-
ment.68 Section B of this Part discusses sustainable development issues that 
arise with subsidies.69 Section C of this Part discusses sustainable development 
issues that arise with labeling schemes.70 Section D of this Part discusses sus-
tainable development issues that arise with local content requirements.71 
A. Direct and Indirect Taxes 
Taxes or tariffs at the border may have burdensome impacts on internation-
al trade. For this reason, the initial negotiations of the GATT focused on the re-
duction of tariffs.72 Furthermore, GATT Articles I and III lay out two principles 
that discourage discrimination between domestic production and imports. GATT 
                                                                                                                           
agreements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the elimi-
nation of discriminatory treatment in international trade relations . . . .”). 
 67 For more on the ways in which these four areas impact the United States’ decarbonization 
efforts, see generally Elizabeth Trujillo, Chapter on International Trade and Deep Decarbonization in 
the U.S. (part of U.S. Deep Decarbonization Pathways Project), in LEGAL PATHWAYS TO DEEP CAR-
BONIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES (Michael B. Gerrard & John C. Dernbach eds., Envtl. Law Inst. 
Publ’n., forthcoming 2018), draft available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=3238243 [https://perma.cc/PWC4-C4QG] [hereinafter Trujillo, Deep Decarbonization]. 
 68 See infra notes 72–96 and accompanying text. 
 69 See infra notes 97–112 and accompanying text. 
 70 See infra notes 113–120 and accompanying text. 
 71 See infra notes 121–131 and accompanying text. 
 72 CHAD P. BROWN, SELF-ENFORCING TRADE: DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND WTO DISPUTE 
SETTLEMENT 11–12 (2009). 
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Article I lays out the most-favored nation principle (“MFN”), stating that “any 
advantage . . . granted by any Member to any product originating in . . . any oth-
er country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product 
originating in . . . all other [WTO] Members.”73 GATT Article III lays out the 
national treatment principle by prohibiting member states from discriminating in 
arbitrary ways between imports and “like [domestic] products.”74 This principle 
ensures that domestic and foreign goods and services are treated equally. Article 
III generally focuses on preserving equal competitive opportunities and encour-
aging market access, while prohibiting domestic measures intended to protect 
domestic production over imports.75 
In determining which measures are protectionist, the focus is on defining 
which imports are “like” domestic products. In determining likeness, the fol-
lowing four criteria are generally used: (1) the physical characteristics of a 
product, including its properties, nature, and quality; (2) the end uses of a 
product in any given market; (3) “consumers’ tastes and habits,” which may 
vary; and (4) tariff classification of the products.76 While these criteria are not 
mutually exclusive, the DSB arguably has placed the greater emphasis on 
points two and three, focusing on the “competitive substitutability” of the im-
ports as they compare to like domestic products.77 
GATT Article III:4 explains that the national treatment principle also ap-
plies to non-fiscal measures; that is, for the most part, regulatory measures.78 
While the analysis also turns on the likeness of the products, the primary focus 
of this section of Article III—as outlined specifically in GATT Article III:2—is 
to ensure that imports are “accorded treatment no less favourable than that ac-
corded to like products of national origin.”79 Though there has been an unwill-
ingness to consider regulatory purpose within the rubric of likeness in Article 
III, the European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-
Containing Products case, involving a French moratorium on the importation 
of asbestos and products with asbestos fibers, somewhat softened this ap-
proach.80 The WTO Appellate Body, in applying Article III(a)(4), focused on 
                                                                                                                           
 73 See GATT, supra note 17, art. I. 
 74 Id. at 204–08. 
 75 Trujillo, Mission Possible, supra note 16, at 211–21 (discussing the interpretation and applica-
tion of GATT Article III). For more discussion on the relationship between domestic production and 
international trade, see generally Alan O. Sykes, Regulatory Protectionism and the Law of Interna-
tional Trade, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1999). 
 76 See Working Party Report, Border Tax Adjustments, ¶ 18, L/3464 (Dec. 2, 1970), GATT BISD 
(18th Supp.), at 101–02 (1972) [hereinafter BTA Report] (setting forth in paragraph 18 the criteria for 
determining likeness set out by the Working Party Report on Border Tax Adjustments). 
 77 See, e.g., Asbestos Report, supra note 46, ¶ 3.439. 
 78 See GATT, supra note 17, art III:4; see also Trujillo, Mission Possible, supra note 16, at 214–
21 (comparing Article III’s application to fiscal and non-fiscal measures). 
 79 See id. 
 80 See generally Asbestos Report, supra note 46. 
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the competitive substitutability between products with asbestos fibers and 
those without them and reasoned that categories of “like” imported products 
could take into consideration regulatory measures with a legitimate public pur-
pose.81 A similar analysis was conducted in the 2012 United States—Measures 
Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove-Cigarettes case involving regula-
tion of the importation of flavored cigarettes.82 
In the investment context, investor-state treaties, BITs, and investment 
treaties found within preferential trade agreements typically contain MFN and 
national treatment clauses to address fiscal and non-fiscal measures impacting 
FDI.83 Furthermore, the fair and equitable treatment and expropriation doc-
trines also address issues pertaining to fiscal and non-fiscal measures impact-
ing FDI. For national treatment in the investment context, rather than assessing 
the likeness of products in a “like products” framework as in trade,84 investor-
state treaties use a “like circumstances” scheme which is arguably broader in 
scope than the one used in the context of trade.85 While the “like circumstanc-
es” scheme also considers the competitive substitutability of investments, it 
further takes into account the totality of the circumstances impacting a particu-
lar investment. The comparison is not necessarily based on origin either. As in 
the context of trade and “like products,” it is in the “like circumstances” analy-
sis where the extent of deference to domestic regulatory frameworks becomes 
particularly relevant.86 
A recurring question under the national treatment rule is whether essen-
tially identical products can be treated differently because of the PPM used to 
produce them.87 This has particular saliency for domestic efforts in climate 
change mitigation. For example, a variety of decarbonization methods, includ-
ing carbon pricing, would reduce greenhouse gas emissions needed to produce 
a particular product. Should a government be able to treat a widget produced 
with high carbon differently than the same kind of widget produced with less 
carbon? In the trade context, the WTO DSB has not definitively ruled on the 
viability of trade discrimination based on differences in PPMs. But, the DSB 
                                                                                                                           
 81 See id. ¶ 99. 
 82 See Clove-Cigarettes Report, supra note 46, ¶ 282. 
 83 See, e.g., CETA, supra note 13, arts. 8.6–.7. 
 84 See GATT, supra note 17, at 205–06. 
 85 See Trujillo, Mission Possible, supra note 16, at 244–45 (citing Pope & Talbot v. Can., Award 
on the Merits of Phase 2, ¶¶ 78–79 (Apr. 10, 2001), 7 ICSID Rep. 102 (2001)). 
 86 Id. at 221, 225. 
 87 See, e.g., Christiane R. Conrad, Process and Production Methods (PPMs) in WTO LAW: IN-
TERFACING TRADE AND SOCIAL GOODS 20–31 (2011). 
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has stated that Article III may, in fact, prohibit discrimination based on differ-
ences in PPMs when the final products are otherwise identical.88 
Trade restrictions based on PPMs remain quite controversial for the 
WTO, and developing countries like Mexico have been hesitant to accept them 
as part of the international trade framework.89 The skepticism is based on the 
fact that PPMs may advantage industrialized countries over less developed 
ones. The adoption of cleaner production methods may be expensive, and re-
quiring them could impact the competitiveness of products coming from de-
veloping countries.90 Border Tax Adjustment (“BTA”) schemes may also be a 
way to address these inequalities in competitiveness; however, such schemes 
must be applied in non-discriminatory ways.91 
GATT Article XX is the trade provision which allows for an exception to 
what would otherwise be a trade violation.92 Several provisions under Article 
XX relate either directly or indirectly to environmental protection.93 Though 
the WTO DSB has become more lenient in recognizing legitimate domestic 
environmental regulatory measures,94 no case to date has involved a domestic 
environmental regulatory measure that has been able to overcome the high 
threshold under the chapeau, or preamble, of Article XX. The chapeau of Arti-
                                                                                                                           
 88 See Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp 
Products, ¶¶ 186–187, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/R (adopted Oct. 12, 1998) [hereinafter US-Shrimp 
Report]. 
 89 See Trujillo, Dialogical Approach, supra note 61, at 551–55 (discussing PPMs in GATT and 
WTO jurisprudence). Arguably, the “like circumstances” framework provides flexibility for more 
social policy space. See supra notes 45–60 and accompanying text. 
 90 Recent WTO jurisprudence has discussed PPMs in the context of technical regulations, like 
labeling schemes, under the TBT. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, United States—Measures Con-
cerning the Importation Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS381/
AB/R (adopted May 16, 2012) [hereinafter US-Tuna II Appellate Body Report]; Panel Report, United 
States—Measures Concerning the Importation Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, WTO 
Doc. WT/CS381/R (adopted Sept. 15, 2011) [hereinafter US-Tuna II Panel Report]. 
 91 See Henrik Horn & Petros C. Mavroidis, To B(TA) or Not to B(TA)? On the Legality and De-
sirability of Border Tax Adjustments from a Trade Perspective, 34 WORLD ECON. 1911, 1914 (2011). 
For a definition of BTAs, see BTA Report, supra note 76, at 98. 
 92 See GATT, supra note 17, at 262–65 (laying out “general exceptions”); see also US-Shrimp 
Report, supra note 88, ¶¶ 156–159 (interpreting GATT Article XX). 
 93 See GATT, supra note 17, at 262 (citing specifically GATT Article XX:I(a), XX:I(b), 
XX:I(g)); see also US-Tuna II Appellate Body Report, supra note 90, ¶ 85 (recognizing an argument 
that Article XX can be used to protect a member state’s environmental measures); US-Tuna II Panel 
Report, supra note 90, ¶¶ VII:458–:460 (recognizing that GATT Article XX allows member states to 
“protect human, animal or plant life or health”); Appellate Body Report, United States—Standards for 
Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WTO Doc. WT/DS2/AB/R (adopted Apr. 29, 1996) (ana-
lyzing a dispute over a United States Environmental Protection Agency regulation under Article XX); 
Asbestos Report, supra note 46, ¶¶ 5.194–.203 (recognizing the ways in which Article XX relates to 
environmental protection). 
 94 See, e.g., Panel Report, Brazil—Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, ¶¶ 145, 340–
341, WTO Doc. WT/DS332/R (adopted June 12, 2007). For more discussion regarding the evolution 
of Article XX jurisprudence in the context of environmental regulation, see Trujillo, Dialogical Ap-
proach, supra note 61, at 550–53. 
2018] Balancing Sustainability and the Right to Regulate 2751 
cle XX disallows trade-restrictive measures that are “applied in a manner 
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination 
between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction 
on international trade.”95 Generally, investor-state treaties do not contain such 
provisions. However, there is a growing trend towards including them, as is 
seen in the 2014 Australia-Korea Free Trade Agreement.96 
B. Subsidies 
Governments have used subsidies as a means of defraying the costs of 
transitioning high emission industries towards cleaner production.97 This is 
particularly relevant in the context of renewable energy projects and the use of 
FIT schemes.98 FIT schemes allow long-term contracts that guarantee payment 
to renewable energy producers for the energy they produce. They create fixed 
prices for electricity and lower barriers to entry, incentivizing more investment 
in renewable energy production.99 It is unclear under WTO jurisprudence if 
FIT schemes are viable subsidies under trade law, but at least one case has rec-
ognized that FIT schemes may in fact constitute a benefit as defined under the 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (“SCM Agreement”).100 
The SCM Agreement does not contain a general exception for subsidies enact-
ed to fulfill a legitimate public purpose such as climate change mitigation.101 
In the investment context, FIT schemes and tax incentives are becoming 
increasingly relevant as a means to help offset the costs of switching to cleaner 
production of energy. This was demonstrated in Charanne B.V. & Construction 
Investments S.A.R.L. v. The Kingdom of Spain in 2016, which was brought un-
                                                                                                                           
 95 GATT, supra note 17, at 262. 
 96 Korea-Australia Free Trade Agreement, S. Kor.-Austl., art. 11.9(5), Apr. 8, 2014, https://dfat.
gov.au/trade/agreements/in-force/kafta/official-documents/Pages/full-text-of-kafta.aspx [https://perma.
cc/5S32-FTXN]. 
 97 See Trujillo, Deep Decarbonization, supra note 67, at 4, 7–8. 
 98 See id. at 4–5. 
 99 Id. 
 100 See Appellate Body Report, Canada—Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, 
¶ 157, WT/DS70/AB/R (Aug. 2, 1999) (stating that “the marketplace provides an appropriate basis for 
comparison in determining whether a ‘benefit has been conferred’”); see also Agreement on Subsidies 
and Countervailing Measures, art. 1.1, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401, https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/24-
scm.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z84L-W8T6] [hereinafter SCM Agreement]. The SCM Agreement defines 
a subsidy as “a financial contribution by a government or any public body” in which a “benefit” is 
“conferred.” Id. arts. 1.1(a)(1), 1.1(b). 
 101 See generally SCM Agreement, supra note 100. Article 8.2 of the SCM Agreement did create 
exceptions for subsidies connected to research and development, regional development, and environ-
mental compliance costs. Id. art. 8.2. However, in 2000, these exceptions expired and they were not 
renewed. See TRACEY EPPS, CHAMPMAN TRIPP & ANDREW GREEN, RECONCILING TRADE AND CLI-
MATE: HOW THE WTO CAN HELP ADDRESS CLIMATE CHANGE 118 (2010). 
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der the Energy Treaty Charter (“ETC”).102 Given the costs of setting up renew-
able energy infrastructures, financial incentives need to be put in place and 
governments can be helpful in this regard. In Windstream Energy, which was 
brought under NAFTA Chapter 11, the FIT program offered a twenty-year 
fixed premium price to be paid by the Ontario Power Authority to producers of 
renewable energy, which in turn would encourage and assist investors to gather 
the necessary financing to pursue such projects.103 Windstream was offered a 
FIT contract in 2010 for an offshore wind project. When the Ontario govern-
ment passed a moratorium in order to do more research on environmental im-
pacts of such projects and an appropriate regulatory framework was put in 
place, Windstream could no longer find the necessary financing and it was ex-
posed to the possibility of contract termination.104 
In cases where governments decide to either modify incentives, update reg-
ulatory frameworks, or delay projects due to environmental impact assessments, 
there may be an indirect expropriation or a fair and equitable treatment violation 
if it is found that adequate due process is not provided to the investor.105 
Both claims—indirect expropriation and fair and equitable treatment vio-
lation—were made in the Charanne case after the Spanish government decided 
to modify its original FIT scheme that provided economic incentives, including 
subsidies to the photovoltaic sector to offset the costs of setting up solar energy 
infrastructure.106 During the Spanish economic crisis, though, the Spanish gov-
ernment decided to reduce some cost by reducing such incentives and raising 
costs for investors in the renewable energy sector.107 Charanne argued that a 
“significant or substantial interference” with the investment was enough to 
prove indirect expropriation,108 and that their legitimate expectations in the 
investment were disrupted, resulting in a fair and equitable treatment viola-
tion.109 The tribunal disagreed with these arguments finding that legitimate 
                                                                                                                           
 102 Charanne B.V. & Constr. Invs. S.A.R.L. v. Spain, Arbitration No. 062/2012, Final Award, 
¶ 283 (Jan. 21, 2016), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw7162.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WNE7-DN5B] (unofficial English translation). This was the first of twenty six simi-
lar cases regarding renewable energy policy reforms. See, e.g., Windstream Energy v. Can., PCA Case 
No. 2013-22, Award, ¶¶ 380–382 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2016), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/
case-documents/italaw7875.pdf [https://perma.cc/LNT5-NJ6K] (finding that treatment of a FIT 
scheme motivated by domestic environmental policy violated fair and equitable treatment). 
 103 Windstream, PCA Case No. 2013-22, Award, ¶ 99. 
 104 Id. ¶¶ 149–160. 
 105 See, e.g., Vandevelde, supra note 25, at 89–96. 
 106 Charanne, Arbitration No. 062/2012, ¶¶ 277–307. 
 107 Id. ¶¶ 148–175. 
 108 Id. ¶¶ 278–290. The claimant referred to Vivendi v. Argentina in making this argument. See 
Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. & Vivendi Universal S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/97/3, Award, ¶ 7.5.17 (Aug. 20, 2007), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/
case-documents/ita0215.pdf [https://perma.cc/9L3K-HE2A] (takings tantamount to expropriation are 
those that result in a substantial loss of control or value of a foreign investment”). 
 109 Charanne, Arbitration No. 062/2012, ¶¶ 291–307. 
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expectations had not been disrupted and that the lowering of profitability of the 
shares in question did not amount to expropriation of the investment in this 
case.110 While its decision to disagree with Spain’s jurisdictional and standing 
arguments was very important with respect to the scope of the ECT,111 the tri-
bunal’s decision regarding Spain’s right to regulate sets an important tone for 
the future relationship of states’ rights with those of investors. It decided that a 
government’s decision to legitimately modify regulatory schemes does not per 
se translate into unfair treatment of investor rights. “[R]egulatory flexibility” 
should be allowed in order “to respond to changing circumstances in the public 
interest.”112 
C. Labeling Schemes 
The TBT Agreement governs technical barriers to trade, which are al-
lowed within certain parameters.113 Technical barriers may include regulations 
regarding the safety and health standards for goods and services, such as li-
censing standards, labels, conformity assessment measures, and even PPMs.114 
Therefore, a regulation, for example, that places a ceiling on fuel emissions in 
the production context could be considered a viable technical regulation under 
the TBT Agreement. However, a technical barrier should not be discriminatory 
under TBT Articles 2.1 and 2.2.115 Under TBT Article 2.2, technical regula-
                                                                                                                           
 110 See id. ¶¶ 455–467 (discussing the tribunal’s holdings regarding Charanne’s expropriation 
claim); id. ¶¶ 476–542 (discussing the tribunal’s holdings regarding Charanne’s fair and equitable 
treatment claim). 
 111 See id. ¶¶ 394–450 (discussing its holding that the tribunal had jurisdiction to hear the dis-
pute). 
 112 See id. ¶ 500 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Of note, there was a dissenting 
opinion in Charanne regarding the legitimate expectations argument. Id. ¶¶ 1–13. 
 113 See generally TBT Agreement, supra note 46. 
 114 See Standards & Safety, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (2018), https://www.wto.org/english/
thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm4_e.htm#TRS [https://perma.cc/AWS4-MU3S] (explaining the im-
portance of technical regulations and standards). The TBT Agreement “aims to ensure that technical 
regulations, standards, and conformity assessment procedures are non-discriminatory and do not cre-
ate unnecessary obstacles to trade.” See Technical Barriers to Trade, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 
(2018), https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tbt_e/tbt_e.htm [https://perma.cc/DD4B-LGNW] 
(summarizing the purpose of the TBT Agreement); see also US-Tuna II Appellate Body Report, supra 
note 90, ¶¶ 344–348 (recognizing that the definition of technical regulation under the TBT Agreement 
may also apply to a dolphin-free label, the measure in question in this dispute). See generally TBT 
Agreement, supra note 46. 
 115 See TBT Agreement, supra note 46, arts. 2.1–.2. The TBT Agreement’s Article 2.1 requires 
that imported products “be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like products 
of national origin and to like products originating in any other country.” Id. art. 2.1. Arguably, risks 
and regulation may be considered in the “like products” analysis under the TBT Agreement. See, e.g., 
Clove-Cigarettes Report, supra note 46, ¶ 298 (finding that the cigarettes at issue were “like products” 
within the meaning of TBT Article 2.1). 
2754 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:2735 
tions may “not be more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfill a legitimate 
objective, taking account of the risks non-fulfillment would create.”116 
Technical regulations are particularly relevant to environmental regulation 
and trade in the context of eco-labeling. These are labels used on products to 
inform consumers of the impact of the production of a good on the environ-
ment.117 They address the life-cycle of a product or service, and therefore impli-
cate PPMs. Eco-labeling schemes are a growing trend for environmental regula-
tion, especially those labels that comply with international standards under the 
International Organization for Standardization (“ISO”) and the Global Ecolabel-
ling Network for guidance.118 Furthermore, eco-labeling schemes fit nicely with 
the growth of market-driven regulatory schemes, which transfer much of the 
responsibility of environmental protection from the state to the consumer. 
On the investment side, TBTs or Standard Related Measures (“SRMs”) 
are also allowed as long as they are not discriminatory. Furthermore, they tend 
to be presumed viable under investment treaties if they comply with interna-
tional standards.119 One of the more well-known investment cases concerning 
labeling is the Australia-Tobacco Labeling case, concerning Australian regula-
tion regarding the use of specific tobacco labels that showed the grim impacts 
of smoking, including cancer and other illnesses, and disallowing the use of 
relevant trademark labels.120 
D. Local Content Requirements 
In trade, local content requirements (“LCRs”) have been linked to FIT 
schemes.121 They are controversial in trade and investment because they re-
quire, “as a condition for financial support,” that “renewable electricity genera-
                                                                                                                           
 116 TBT Agreement, supra note 46, art. 2.2. 
 117 See What Is Ecolabelling?, GLOBAL ECOLABELLING NETWORK, https://globalecolabelling.net/
what-is-eco-labelling/ [https://perma.cc/JL49-XNJA] (defining eco-labeling). 
 118 See id. (explaining the three types of eco-labeling set out by the International Organization for 
Standardization). For more information on eco-labeling as a transnational regulatory norm, see Trujil-
lo, Regulatory Cooperation, supra note 15, at 380–85. 
 119 See, e.g., NAFTA, supra note 16, arts. 904–05. 
 120 See generally Philip Morris Asia Ltd. v. Australia, PCA Case No. 2012-12, Award on Juris-
diction & Admissibility (Perm. Ct. Arb. Dec. 17, 2015), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/
case-documents/italaw7303_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/H9R5-WMA2]. For the case involving Australian 
regulation of specific tobacco labeling in the trade context, see generally Panel Report, Australia—
Certain Measures Concerning Trademarks, Geographical Indications, and Other Plain Packaging 
Requirements Applicable to Tobacco Products and Packaging, WTO Doc. WT/DS435/R, WT/DS441/
R, WT/DS458/R, WT/DS467/R (adopted June 28, 2018). See also, Bryce Baschuk, WTO Tobacco 
Ruling Opens Door to New Plain Packaging Laws, BLOOMBERG (June 28, 2018), https://www.
bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-06-28/wto-tobacco-ruling-opens-door-to-new-plain-packaging-
laws. 
 121 See, e.g., Trujillo, Deep Decarbonization, supra note 67, at 15–16. Though much of trade 
jurisprudence regarding LCRs has also concerned a FIT scheme, the two are mutually exclusive and 
one does not necessarily require the other. 
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tors . . . source a previously defined share of components for their final prod-
ucts from local manufacturing or assembly.”122 Though LCRs are usually 
found to be protectionist under trade rules unless they fall within the govern-
ment procurement exception under GATT Article III:8,123 they do allow local 
governments to garner political support, especially in conjunction with policies 
intended to create local jobs and for economic incentive packages for new 
technologies and products needed for viable renewable energy plans.124 WTO 
cases addressing LCRs have generally found the LCR in violation of trade 
rules because they favor the protection of domestic production over that of im-
ports for the sole purpose that it is domestic, thereby violating the market prin-
ciples underlying free trade liberalization.125 However, the Canada—Certain 
Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation Sector case also stated 
that the determination of whether such a competitive relationship exists may 
also include the “inputs and processes of production used to produce the prod-
uct,” thereby opening the door for PPMs in this context.126 In the India—
Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and Solar Modules case between the 
United States and India, India made an argument under GATT Article XX(j) 
that LCRs were required because India was a developing country. Specifically, 
India argued that, as a developing country, it needed to break into the renewa-
ble energy market because it was essential to its decarbonization goals, and 
solar cells were in short-supply in India.127 Though raising interesting ques-
tions regarding the ways that free trade may provide opportunities for develop-
                                                                                                                           
 122 Jan Christoph Kuntze & Tom Moerenhout, Are Feed-in Tariff Schemes with Local Content 
Requirements Consistent with WTO Law? in FRONTIERS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: LEGAL 
TOOLS TO CONFRONT INTERDISCIPLINARY CHALLENGES 151–180 (Freya Baetens & José Caiado 
eds., 2014). 
 123 See GATT, supra note 17, at 206–08. In Canada—Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable 
Energy Generation Sector, Canada defended its LCRs and FIT scheme under this argument. See Can-
ada—Renewable Energy Measures, supra note 53, ¶¶ 2.1–.9. 
 124 For discussion on the political necessity of the LCRs in the context of trade, see generally Tim 
Meyer, How Local Discrimination Can Promote Global Public Goods, 95 B.U. L. REV. 1937 (2015). 
 125 See, e.g., Canada—Renewable Energy Measures, supra note 53, ¶¶ 5.75–.85; see also Appel-
late Body Report, Canada—Measures Relating to Feed-in Tariff Program, WTO Doc. WT/DS 
426/AB/R (adopted May 6, 2013). The Appellate Body decided these cases together as they related to 
the same Canadian FIT program, the former case brought by Japan, and the latter by the EU. Japan 
also alleged that the Ontario law at issue violated Article 2.1 of the Trade-Related Investment 
Measures (“TRIMS”) Agreement. See generally Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, 
art. 2.1, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 
1868 U.N.T.S. 186, https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/18-trims_e.htm [https://perma.cc/
X779-3CY4] [hereinafter TRIMS Agreement] 
 126 See Canada—Renewable Energy Measures, supra note 53, ¶ 5.63. 
 127 See Appellate Body Report, India—Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and Solar Mod-
ules, ¶ 5.46, WTO Doc. WT/DS456/AB/R (Sept. 16, 2016) [hereinafter India—Solar Modules]; see 
also GATT, supra note 17, at 264 (“[N]othing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the 
adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures . . . essential to the acquisition or distri-
bution of products in general local short supply.”). 
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ing countries, or for countries creating new essential markets, to transition their 
economies towards cleaner productions of energy, the Appellate Body decided 
that India did not demonstrate that the renewable energy equipment in question 
was indeed in short supply domestically.128 
In the investment context, LCRs are linked to performance requirements, 
which are generally not allowed in investor-state treaties.129 Performance re-
quirements provide that the establishment of an investment may not be condi-
tioned on the use of domestic products or services, on achieving a given level of 
preference for goods or services produced domestically, on conditions, or on 
levels of exports.130 Therefore, the trend of imposing LCRs to FIT schemes or 
other renewable energy incentives would also violate investment law. In fact, 
several of the above-mentioned WTO disputes on this topic also included argu-
ments on violations under the Trade-Related Investment Measures Agreement 
(“TRIMS”).131 As in the case of free trade, the question would be whether LCRs 
become necessary for certain domestic clean energy and climate change mitiga-
tion strategies that may not otherwise take place without those LCRs. There are 
no straight-forward solutions within the context of traditional investment rules. 
III. ISSUES MOVING FORWARD 
The right to regulate in the international investment regime, specifically 
concerning natural resources, will face challenges moving forward. Issues are 
bound to arise as protectionism continues to spread, especially as some coun-
tries in Latin America establish constitutional reforms with respect to envi-
ronmental protection.132 
Section A of this Part briefly discusses the rise of protectionism around 
the world.133 Section B of this Part seeks to find common ground between the 
interests of international investors and the interests of domestic environmental 
policies.134 Section C of this Part discusses how certain nations in Latin Amer-
ica have enacted constitutional provisions to protect their natural resources, 
and how this may affect international investment.135 
                                                                                                                           
 128 India—Solar Modules, supra note 127, ¶ 6.4. 
 129 See, e.g., NAFTA, supra note 16, art. 1106 (stating that “no Party may impose” certain re-
quirements “in connection to the establishment, acquisition, expansion,” etc. of an investment, includ-
ing, “to achieve a given level or percentage of domestic content”). 
 130 See id. 
 131 See, e.g., Canada—Renewable Energy Measures, supra note 53, ¶ 2.65 (explaining how Japan 
also alleged that the Ontario law at issue violated Article 2.1 of the TRIMS Agreement). 
 132 See infra notes 136–142 and accompanying text. 
 133 See infra notes 136–142 and accompanying text. 
 134 See infra notes 143–162 and accompanying text. 
 135 See infra notes 163–182 and accompanying text. 
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A. Rise of Protectionism 
Currently, there are several trends impacting investment law, one of 
which is a popular backlash towards globalization and a return to protecting 
local production. This backlash is occurring in the midst of a need to reimagine 
the relationship between regulation and free trade, and in turn, the role of in-
vestment in economic development. For a long time, developing countries 
were concerned with what they considered to be unfair use of investor-state 
arbitration as a means of pressuring change domestically and pricing out local 
industry. In some cases, in Latin America, for example, some countries have 
reacted by exiting the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Dis-
putes (“ICSID”).136 However, recent trends are also occurring in industrialized 
nations, where rising skepticism is causing the return of populism and a retreat 
from the desire to come under international governance structures like interna-
tional arbitration. This was reflected, for example, during the negotiations of 
the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (“TTIP”) where several 
European nations reacted negatively to the idea of an investment court with ap-
pellate capacities.137 Under CETA,138 there were discussions as to implementa-
tion of the investment chapter and the applicability of the Investment Court on 
individual European countries as well as its relationship with the European Court 
of Human Rights.139 The Brexit movement is another example of this retreat.140 
The United States is also facing challenges with regard to the level of par-
ticipation in global governance. Recent tariffs by the Trump Administration are 
an indication of a desire to reduce global trading engagements in order to pro-
tect local industry. There is little proof that these tariffs will lead to the growth 
of the domestic manufacturing sectors they are intended to save, especially 
relative to the long-term costs of such tariffs on the growth of the economy 
                                                                                                                           
 136 See, e.g., Fernando Carbrera Diaz, Ecuador Continues Exit from ICSID, INV. TREATY NEWS 
(June 8, 2009), https://www.iisd.org/itn/es/2009/06/05/ecuador-continues-exit-from-icsid/ [https://
perma.cc/YKW2-9RK7] (explaining that Ecuador was “denouncing [ICSID],” an institution Ecuado-
rian president Rafael Correa called “an atrocity” that “signifies colonialism”). 
 137 See, e.g., European Parliament Press Release IPR/89/201, The Parliament, MEPs Debate Plans 
for a Multilateral Investment Court (Nov. 30, 2017) (addressing the debate between members of the 
European Parliament concerning the creation of an investment court). 
 138 See, e.g., CETA, supra note 13. Chapter 8 of the CETA addresses issues related to investment. 
Id. 
 139 See generally Laura Puccio & Roderick Harte, From Arbitration to the Investment Court Sys-
tem (ICS), EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARY RESEARCH SERV. (June 2017), http://www.europarl.europa.
eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2017/607251/EPRS_IDA(2017)607251_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/7E8A-
GCXY]. 
 140 One of the issues being discussed in the Brexit negotiations is the extent to which the Europe-
an Court of Justice would have jurisdiction over Britain. Daniel Boffey, Brussels Seeks to Tie UK to 
European Human Rights Court After Brexit, THE GUARDIAN (June 18, 2018), https://www.the
guardian.com/law/2018/jun/18/brussels-seeks-to-tie-uk-to-european-human-rights-court-after-brexit 
[https://perma.cc/DAC9-N5FC]. 
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which has, for some time, been integrated into a world economy with truly 
global supply-chains.141 These protectionist tendencies arguably were already 
evident before though, especially after the 2009 economic crisis in the United 
States. The rise of “Buy America” provisions and LCRs in the emerging re-
newable energy markets, and emphasis on the sovereign right to regulate are 
indications of this trend, which also has reared its head in Europe.142 They also 
reflect the growing sentiment of the need and the desire to address the negative 
impacts of trade and investment, and in turn globalization, on local economies 
and the role of government in that context. Despite skepticism regarding glob-
alization, there continues to be a desire for investment to grow and for U.S. 
companies to have the ability to invest outside its borders. Furthermore, the 
need to shift high-emission economies toward clean ones brings more oppor-
tunities for investment and trade to play key roles in this transition. This can 
occur only if both international trade and investment regimes are updated to 
accommodate the need for social policy space at the domestic level. Interest-
ingly, addressing climate change through clean energy projects is one area 
where trade, investment, and environmental issues may find common ground. 
B. Finding Common Ground: New Challenges for Investment 
One of the biggest challenges in reconciling the interests of investors with 
those of protecting the environment is finding common goals and a common 
language. If economic development includes using natural resources efficiently 
and the use and investing in more and more energy without consideration to 
the impacts, the goals of protecting the environment are not necessarily served. 
However, in order to meet the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals, more FDI 
is needed, especially in developing countries and in sectors such as power and 
energy infrastructure.143 In the last few years, there has been an uptick in in-
                                                                                                                           
 141 See Heather Long, Trump Has Officially Put More Tariffs on U.S. Allies Than on China, 
WASH. POST (May 31, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2018/05/31/trump-
has-officially-put-more-tariffs-on-u-s-allies-than-on-china/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.5f0222d39c33 
[https://perma.cc/T5GQ-TWG4]; The Trump Administration Imposes Tariffs on America’s Closest 
Allies, THE ECONOMIST (June 1, 2018), https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2018/06/
01/the-trump-administration-imposes-tariffs-on-americas-closest-allies [https://perma.cc/558A-F2ZR]; 
see also, Bill Chappell, China Files Complaint Over U.S. Tariffs on $200 Billion of Imports, NPR 
(July 16, 2018,), https://www.npr.org/2018/07/16/629390937/china-files-wto-complaint-over-u-s-
tariff-on-200-billion-of-imports [https://perma.cc/9AHU-7MV7]. 
 142 See The Green Investment Report, WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, http://reports.weforum.org/
green-investing-2013/green-investment-current-flows-and-future-needs/ [https://perma.cc/FS4L-
3JEA]; see also Office of Energy Efficiency & Renewable Energy, 4 Charts That Show Renewable 
Energy Is on the Rise in America, DEP’T OF ENERGY (Nov. 14, 2016), https://www.energy.gov/eere/
articles/4-charts-show-renewable-energy-rise-america [https://perma.cc/6V54-BDTQ] [hereinafter 
Energy Charts]. 
 143 See Sustainable Development Goals, United Nations Sustainable Development Knowledge 
Platform, https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdgs [https://perma.cc/BA5B-GSAX]. 
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vestment in green technologies, and government incentives such as subsidies, 
tax credits, and FIT schemes have been helpful in this regard.144 When it 
comes to decarbonization strategies and economic development, common 
ground between trade, investment, and environmental protection can be found. 
Evidence suggests that in 2016, renewable energy projects in the United States 
have been on the rise due to government incentives, thereby bringing down the 
costs of renewable energy.145 Recent backpedaling on these incentives, howev-
er, will have a perverse effect on these advances.146 
In trade, dialogue among trade policy makers and environmental regula-
tors in addition to multilateral efforts to negotiate environmental goods agree-
ment has helped to raise awareness of updating trade treaties and trade juris-
prudence to accommodate for more social policy space in the area of environ-
mental protection and climate change mitigation. Without the help of govern-
ment to offset the costs of transitioning towards cleaner markets, the private 
sector is unlikely to do so. Consumer awareness is also needed in this transi-
tion making eco-labeling particularly salient in finding common ground. As 
UNCTAD continues its International Investment Agreements (“IIA”) invest-
ment reform, differences in language and the need for more dialogue among 
regulators, arbitrators, and the private sector, in addition to policy makers, is 
needed to help reconcile each legal framework’s different focus.147 
One case that brings to light these differences is the Clayton/Bilcon v. 
Government of Canada case brought under NAFTA Chapter 11.148 This case 
involved a group of U.S. investors who wanted to begin developing a mining 
quarry in Nova Scotia for concrete production.149 The project also included the 
development of a marine terminal to facilitate shipment of the cement back to 
                                                                                                                           
 144 See Bill Maloney, Renewable Energy Subsidies—Yes or No?, FORBES (Mar. 23, 2018), https://
www.forbes.com/sites/uhenergy/2018/03/23/renewable-energy-subsidies-yes-or-no/#571a152f6e23 
[https://perma.cc/M6VZ-R7LM]. 
 145 Energy Charts, supra note 142. As of 2016: 
[R]enewable energy capacity now produces 14% of all domestic electricity . . . . With 
help from federal tax credits, the power purchase agreement price for wind has fallen 
from roughly ¢ 7 per kilowatt-hour in 2009 to an average of ¢ 2 per kilowatt-hour in 
some regions of the country today. 
Id. 
 146 Coral Davenport et al., What Is the Clean Power Plan? And How Can Trump Repeal It?, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/10/climate/epa-clean-power-plan.html 
[https://perma.cc/9ZAH-63HU] (explaining the Clean Power Plan, an Obama Administration clean 
energy plan that has recently been rescinded). 
 147 See, e.g., Reform of the IIA Regime, UNCTAD INVESTMENT POLICY HUB (2013), http://
investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/KeyIssueDetails/42 [https://perma.cc/LU3E-RGK2] (setting up 
dialogue for concerns over the current investor-state dispute system). 
 148 See generally Bilcon of Del. Inc. v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 
2009-04, Award on Jurisdiction and Liability (Perm. Ct. Arb. Mar. 17, 2015). 
 149 Id. ¶¶ 7–8. 
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the United States.150 After receiving encouragement from the provincial and 
federal governments and a permit to begin the project, the project was denied 
under a Joint Review Panel (“JRP”), a panel made up of federal and provincial 
authorities.151 The JRP rejected Bilcon’s Environmental Impact Statement, 
stating that it did not adequately address the environmental and economic im-
pacts of the project and that it went against the “community core values” of the 
area.152 The investors brought a fair and equitable treatment violation claim, in 
addition to national treatment and expropriation claims, against Canada under 
NAFTA Chapter 11.153 Local communities were concerned about the social, 
environmental, and economic impacts of the quarry in the region, especially on 
the fishing and eco-tourism industries as well as the local indigenous commu-
nity.154 In finding for the investors, the tribunal found a violation of fair and 
equitable treatment because it found the JRP process to be arbitrary and lack-
ing in transparency.155 Further, the tribunal found that Bilcon was unfairly in-
duced to invest in the region by government officials.156 The dissent noted that 
the tribunal treated the investors’ rights in this case as if it were a property zon-
ing issue, rather than one that took into consideration the “human environment 
effects assessment” and Bilcon’s limited community engagement in its pro-
ject.157 
The JRP report in question focused on an understanding of sustainable 
development that “suggests that communities make decisions about the use 
and commitment of resources while respecting the rights of future generations 
and other communities to social, economic and environmental health.”158 Bil-
con’s environmental impact statement did not address these issues but rather 
focused on the ways that the project would create jobs, albeit jobs that were 
not necessarily in line with the “community[‘s] core values.”159 This case is a 
                                                                                                                           
 150 Id. 
 151 Id. ¶¶ 5, 14–15. 
 152 Id. ¶¶ 371–383. Under Canadian federalism, such assessments are usually done provincially, 
but in this case, because of the marine terminal, the federal government was also involved. Id. ¶ 5. 
 153 Id. ¶¶ 6–26. 
 154 Id. ¶ 26. 
 155 Id. ¶¶ 588–604. 
 156 Id. ¶¶ 455–487. 
 157 Id., Dissenting Opinion, ¶¶ 26–27. 
 158 See Joint Review Panel Report, Environmental Assessment of the Whites Point Quarry and 
Marine Terminal Project, 3 (Oct. 2007), https://www.novascotia.ca/nse/ea/whitespointquarry/Whites
PointQuarryFinalReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/K29E-ZRVN] (defining “sustainable development” as 
one of the Joint Review Panel’s “five guiding principles” in making its environmental assesments); 
Douglas A. Kysar, Sustainability, Distribution, and the Macroeconomic Analysis of Law, 43 B.C. L. 
REV. 1, 23–24 (2001) (elaborating on the UN’s defintion of sustainable development as “development 
that ‘meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet 
their own needs’” (citations omitted)). 
 159 Bilcon, PCA Case No. 2009-04, Award on Jurisdiction & Liability, ¶¶ 373–376. 
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good indication of the challenges that lie ahead for investment as governments 
take into account more sustainable ways of achieving economic development. 
Aside from the concern that an investor-state tribunal could effectively 
adjudicate whether a federal environmental impact assessment is in breach of 
domestic federal law, as in Bilcon,160 this case highlights that socio-economic 
impacts will increasingly be taken into consideration in domestic environmen-
tal impact assessments.161 These impacts are harder to quantify scientifically, 
but they do have lasting effects on local communities and ecosystems. Invest-
ment laws influenced by the doctrines of fair and equitable treatment, expro-
priation, and national treatment do not adequately capture these kinds of socio-
economic and environmental impacts. The extent to which investment law will 
defer to domestic regulatory schemes will be increasingly important for invest-
ment tribunals. One way to address these differences in language and legal 
standards is to increase transnational dialogue in the negotiations processes of 
treaties and to include in treaties mechanisms of ongoing dialogue through regu-
latory councils or committees. We have seen some progress in this regard in the 
context of recent preferential trade agreements that establish formal methods of 
dialogue through regulatory coordination and the establishment of committees 
consisting of regulators and trade policy-makers.162 Important, though, is to also 
include public participation by all stakeholders, to ameliorate a “fox in the hen-
house” problem that could emerge if regulators begin to pursue trade interests 
rather than the interests of the public. 
C. Constitutionalism and Investment: Examples in Latin America 
Some countries in Latin America have turned their back to foreign in-
vestment under the ICSID framework.163 Instead, they are addressing the 
preservation of their own natural resources through constitutional reform. Bo-
livia and Ecuador, for example, have amended their constitutions to incorpo-
rate the right to manage their natural resources.164 How will investment treaties 
and investor-state tribunals deal with a constitutionally protected right to regu-
late the environment moving forward? 
                                                                                                                           
 160 Id., Dissenting Opinion, ¶ 2 (disagreeing with the majority because “it applies the standard in a 
way that it is met simply by an allegation of a breach of Canadian law”). 
 161 See id. ¶ 27. 
 162 See supra notes 29–44 and accompanying text. 
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In 2008, Ecuador changed its constitution to include a Right to Nature 
provision.165 There have been several cases involving this right,166 but in 2011, 
a local court from the Province of Loja decided the first successful case that 
defended the right of the Vilcabamba River in Southern Ecuador.167 The case 
concerned the construction and expansion of a road where no environmental 
impact assessment was done and the debris was left to pollute the river.168 The 
court embraced the Right to Nature provision of the constitution, and estab-
lished an analytical approach that includes the precautionary principle that fu-
ture courts will likely follow.169 It also placed the burden on the defendant to 
show that its actions would not damage the environment.170 
Another Right to Nature case that directly involved investors was recently 
resolved in 2017.171 The case involved the local community in the Canton of 
San Lorenzo and Los Andes and Palesema Oil Palm Companies in which the 
plaintiffs accused Los Andes and Palesema of environmental damages includ-
ing deforestation, biodiversity loss, pollution, and health and food deterioration 
in the region due to their plantations for palm oil in the region.172 They asked 
the court for Los Andes and Palesema to repair damages and to stop harmful 
activities.173 Interestingly, the court concluded that it was primarily the state’s 
responsibility to end the expansion of agricultural oil palm industry in the re-
gion, rather than making Los Andes and Palesema pay damages. The compa-
nies were ordered to adhere to environmental law in the region, to pay for em-
ployees to take a history course on the culture and traditions of the indigenous 
group of the region, and to retain a good relationship with the earth and the 
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plaintiffs and their families.174 As interpreted by this Ecuadorian court, the 
Right to Nature was a responsibility of the state, rather than the private inves-
tors.175 Though there is still much uncertainty as to how to enforce and imple-
ment this constitutional right and the extent to which it creates a duty on the 
state to protect the environment and how this duty interacts with other duties 
such as the protection of indigenous rights to use their land and to protect 
commerce, it is also unclear to what extent state action in this context would be 
allowed under investment law. 
Another framework that will increasingly have impact on Latin America 
and in the discourse of environmental law with human rights is the Inter-
American Commission of Human Rights. This was created through the 1948 
Charter of Organization of Human Rights as a response to concerns for human 
rights violations in Latin America and the rise of autocratic governments in the 
region.176 In addition to adjudicating human rights violation claims by victims, 
the Court of Inter-American Human Rights, established under the 1969 Ameri-
can Convention of Human Rights, also issues Advisory Opinions.177 In No-
vember 2017, the Court of Inter-American Human Rights issued an important 
Advisory Opinion for environmental and human rights at the request of Co-
lombia.178 It recognized the “irrefutable relationship beween the protection of 
the environment and the realization of other human rights, due to the fact that 
environmental degradation affects the effective enjoyment of other human 
rights.”179 It framed “the human right to a healthy environment” as a right with 
“both individual and collective connotations.”180 It further stated that the right 
to a healthy environment was an “autonomous right,” with substantive and 
procedural rights by the state.181 In doing so, it reiterated the important principle 
that states have the autonomy to pass better environmental policies, which in-
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clude stakeholder participation.182 This is an important step for sustainable de-
velopment and the right to regulate, especially in a region with significant natu-
ral resources. In framing the right to a healthy environment as a human right and 
within the obligations of the state to protect, the Court of Inter-American Human 
Rights has also redefined the regulatory role of the state in this context, which 
could also impact the way it manages investment in natural resources moving 
forward. 
CONCLUSION 
Reconciling environmental protection concerns with the rights of inves-
tors through investor-state investment is no easy task. Human rights and envi-
ronmental rights groups have for a long time questioned the ability of invest-
ment treaties to properly address these issues. At the same time, FDI can con-
tribute toward the transfer of much needed technology as developing and de-
veloped countries transition their economies toward cleaner methods of pro-
duction and energy. Where trade jurisprudence has demonstrated a willingness 
to allow for more social policy space, investment treaties can do the same. A 
look into some of the challenges trade regulators have faced regarding envi-
ronmental regulation may provide some perspective as investment law reforms 
are underway. However, broader constitutional and human rights issues remain 
relevant, as is becoming increasingly evident in Latin America where many 
countries are moving away from traditional FDI treaties and looking for more 
rights-based solutions to protect their natural resources. 
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